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as the First Global Europe FTA 




  The Global Europe Initiative was the declaration of the European Commission 
to focus on the competitiveness of the EU in external trade, securing real market 
access. The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is the first to be concluded 
under this new initiative. So far, the EU has concluded Regional Trade Agreements 
which were accession-oriented or had a particular focus on development issues. 
As the EU-Korea FTA is the most comprehensive free trade agreement that the 
EU ever negotiated, it is also a new generation FTA. Not only does it include 
provisions in terms of eliminating tariffs for goods and services, but the EU-Korea 
FTA also includes provisions on difficult areas such as investments in services 
and industrial sectors, as well as on protection of intellectual property, public 
procurement, competition rules, transparency of regulation and sustainable development. 
It is significant that in most areas the FTA builds on existing multilateral 
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agreements and declarations within the framework of the WTO Legal System. 
WTO compliance is an important issue throughout the EU-Korea FTA. The 
analysis on selected chapters of the Agreement will show that the provisions are 
built on existing WTO instruments and go substantively beyond them.
  In the concluding part, the question will be raised if the FTA at hand is 
compatible with the WTO system and if it is to herald a new era in world trade, 
shifting from multilateral agreements to a network of bilateral agreements. 
Keywords: EU-Korea FTA, regional trade agreement, EU global europe strategy, 
WTO-plus provisions. mixed agreements
 
A. Introduction
The Council of the European Union mandated the European Commission1) for 
negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement with the Republic of Korea2) on 23 April 
2007, pursuant its ‘Global Europe’ Strategy’3) upon which negotiations started in 
Seoul in May of the same year. Notably, it took only eight rounds of talks for 
the agreement to be initialed by both parties already on 15 October 2009. The 
Council approved it on 16 September 2010 so that the Agreement could officially 
and solemnly be signed by both parties on the EU-Korea Summit in Brussels on 
6 October 2010. The European Parliament approved4) it on 17 February 2011 and 
1) The European Commission needs to be granted a negotiating role in matters of shared 
or exclusive competence of EU Member States regarding the conclusion of international 
treaties, Art. 218 (2) TFEU; cf. T Oppermann, CD Classen and M Nettesheim, 
Europarecht (5th edn, C.H. Beck 2011) 636f.; I Smyth, ‘Mixity in Practice – A 
Member State Practioner’s Perspective’, in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed 
Agreements Revisited (Hart Publ 2010) 304, 305.
2) Agenda item 21 (i) on the ‘List of “A” Items‘(8507/07) for the 2795th meeting of the 
Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, Luxembourg, 
23 April 2007; also decision (same agenda item) on mandates for the same kind of 
negotiations also with India and ASEAN.
3) Communication of the European Commission, External Trade, Global Europe (October 
2006), available at [http://ec.europa.eu/trade] visited on [7.9.2011]; see for details below 
under B. IV.
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ratification by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea followed in 4 
May 2011. Thus, it took only about 2 years for the EU to conclude its first 
Global Europe Free Trade Agreement.
Application of provisions of the EU-Korea FTA entered into force officially on 
1 July 2011. Yet, strictly and legally speaking, the Agreement is still not finally 
in force as the ratification process is still pending: In the ‘general definitions’ part 
of the FTA, Art. 1.2 stipulates
  “the Parties mean, on the one hand, the European Union or its Member States 
or the European Union and its Member States within their respective areas of 
competence as derived from the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the “EU Party”), 
and on the other hand, Korea;” (Emphasis added by the author)
This formulation indicates that the EU-Korea FTA is a so-called Mixity: A 
Mixed Agreement of the European Union in its external relationship. The Principle 
of Enumerated Powers5) safeguards the sovereign competences of Member States. 
This means for the present FTA, that all EU Member States have to ratify this 
Agreement according to their national constitutions,6) which usually takes quite a 
bit of time.7)
In accordance with Art. 15.10.5 lit. (a) EU-Korea FTA and in virtue of Art. 218 
4) With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has a right to be consulted 
relating to the conclusion of international agreements, Art. 218 (6)(b) TFEU; cf. R 
Mögele on Art. 218 AEUV, MN 18 in: R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV (2
nd
 edn, C.H. 
Beck 2012); P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (OUP 2010) 390.
5) Art. 5 (1) cl. 1, (2) TEU; cf. R Streinz, Europarecht (9
th
 edn, C.F. Müller 2012) MN 
539.
6) R Mögele on Art. 218 AEUV, MN 30 in: R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV (2
nd
 edn, C.H. 
Beck 2012).
7) e.g. the FTA with South Africa was signed in 1999 and was finally ratified in 2005, 
see M Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’, 1 EYIEL 
(2010) 245, 260, FN 62; the worst example is the Agreement Establishing a Customs 
Union with San Marino of December 1991 which entered into force on 1 April 2002, 
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(5) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU Council 
has decided in favour of a provisional application and therefore it has entered into 
force provisionally. In the Preamble (9) of this Council Decision,8) we see a very 
careful wording concerning the allocation of competences within the EU legal 
system. 
“The provisional application foreseen in this Decision does not prejudge the 
allocation of competences between the Union and its Member States in accordance 
with the Treaties,”
In this regard, the EU-Korea FTA has effectively entered into force 1 July 
2011.
B. New Approach
The EU-Korea FTA is certainly not the first Regional Trade Agreement (RTA)9)  
the EU has negotiated, but it marks a significant premiere. A very brief overview10) 
of what kind of RTAs the EU has so far concluded will reveal what is so new 
about the approach for the present FTA.
I. Accession-oriented Agreements
Stabilization and Association Agreements are the typical accession-oriented 
8) OJ EU 2011 L 127/1 (14 May 2011), Council Decision of 16 September 2010 
(2011/265/EU).
9) RTAs are understood and used here as a general term, embracing FTAs, customs union 
and similar concepts that qualify according to Art. XXIV GATT, cf. L Bartels, 
‘Regional Trade Agreements’ in: R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press 2011, online edition, [www.mpepil.com], 
visited on [21.3.2012], MN 1ff.; cf. DC Horng, ‘Reshaping the EU’s FTA Policy in a 
Globalizing Economy: The Case of the EU-Korea FTA,’ 46 Journal of World Trade 
(2012) 301, 302.
10) See for more details Cremona (n 7) 250ff. DC Horng (n 9) 303.
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agreements that the EU concluded with prospective Member States. The main 
orientation of such agreements is the preparation for a possible membership in the 
EU. For such, agreements focused on market freedom, meeting requirements of 
“community standards” or today according to the Treaty of Lisbon, “union standards”.
Quite significant among these agreements is the Ankara Agreement of 1963 
with Turkey, which is the oldest of this kind, noting that Turkey is still not a 
member of the European Union. 
II. Neighbours
RTAs with neighbouring States to the EU, such as the European Economic 
Area Agreement (EEA) devote mainly on economic integration, free trade and 
development issues. These States typically have decided not to become member of 
the EU. Whatsoever, this does not exclude that such contracting States can be 
prospective Member States. Austria, Finland and Sweden are examples of such 
parties to the EEA that have finally having acceded to the EU. 
Switzerland is a special case in the EU’s RTA practice: the EU-Swiss Bilateral 
Agreements show a very high degree of economic integration with the EU; Swiss 
laws are practically “mirroring” EU-legislation. For instance, Switzerland adopted 
the Schengen acquis, a regulation that allows practically border free travelling, 
with concluding the agreements of the so-called Second Round of Bilaterals 
(Bilaterale II). 
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMA) are association agreements 
between the EU and each of Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, 
Lebanon and an Interim Agreement for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority 
which are designed to establish a framework for political dialogue, to lead to a 
free trade area and the possibility of trade in services and movement of capital. 
EMAs mainly focus on partnership and development issues. 
Agreements with States of the former Soviet Union called Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCA) focusing on reciprocal abolition of quantitative 
restrictions and safeguard, anti-dumping and “infant-industry” clauses follow the 
strategy to develop a partnership with emphasis on assistance and aid in establishing 
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the rule of law and human rights protection. Strictly speaking, PCAs are not 
characterized as RTAs which are understood to trigger the Art. XXIV GATT or 
Art. V GATS mechanism, but contain clauses for later FTAs. 
III. Development: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)
Partners for EPAs are typically developing countries, called ACP countries: 
African, Caribbean and Pacific States most of which are within the framework of 
the Cotonou Convention. A total of 78 ACP parties have concluded six EPAs 
with an overt focus on development whereas Free Trade Agreements with Mexico 
and Chile are examples11) where regional trade integration outweighs the 
development aspect.
IV. Global Market Access
As just shown, the EU has mainly concluded Regional Trade Agreements with 
potential Member States with a particular focus on stabilization, association and a 
final possible accession to the EU. Another major part of RTAs underlined the 
EUs external policy of development aid, regional stabilization and integration as 
well as good interstate relations. 
A new approach was presented in October 2006 when the European Commission 
(so-called Barroso-I-Commission) presented its policy in external trade through a 
publication entitled “Global Europe, competing in the world—A Contribution to 
the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy”.12) With this communication the Commission 
set new goals in negotiating Regional Trade Agreements. It is frequently referred 
to as “Global Europe Initiative” and “Global Europe Strategy” of the European 
Commission.  
The Global Strategy is an integrated approach to trade policy, linking the 
11) These agreements are presented as supporting regional integration among Latin 
American states, but not yet following a market access objective; cf. Cremona, (n 7) 
260.
12) Communication of the European Commission, External Trade, Global Europe (October 
2006), available at [http://ec.europa.eu/trade] visited on [7.9.2011].
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internal and external aspects of the EU’s competitiveness. The EU has recognized 
that its openness and commitment to development by themselves have not done 
any favour neither for its trade balances nor global competitiveness. The Strategy 
Report13) formulates eight specific areas of action:
1. The WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
2. Launch of new competitiveness-driven FTAs
3. Transatlantic trade and competitiveness
4. China
5. Intellectual Property Rights enforcement
6. Renewed Market Access Strategy (Identification of key barriers/Implementing 
appropriate measures to eliminate such barriers)
7. Public Procurement
8. Review of the Trade Defence Instruments
Of these eight areas, the new strategy approach will be presented on the selected 
first two areas, the WTO Doha Development Agenda (1) and the new competitiveness- 
driven FTAs (2). 
❙The WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA):
A successful conclusion of the DDA, even according to the assessment of the 
European Commission,14) seems to remain out of reach after the failure of Cancun 
in 2004 and further attempts initiated by the EU.15) The EU so far was a strong 
advocator of multilateral trade agreements and was therefore very keen on 
carrying the commitments to the WTO arena. 
13) Report on Progress Achieved on the Global Europe Strategy, 2006-2010 of the 
European Commission, SEC(2010) 1268/2, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/index_en.htm] 
visited on [25.8.2011] 4.
14) See Report of the European Commission (n 13) 4-5.
15) See for details of the failure of the Doha Round: SJ Cho, ‘Is the WTO Passe?: Exploring 
the Meaning of the Doha Debacle’ (1 May 2009) available at [http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1403464] visited on [21.3.2012] 10-25.
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The United States on the other hand, has gone forward shortly after the failure 
to conclude the Doha Round, to give priority to bilateral and regional trade 
agreements in preference to multilateral instruments.16) 
As there is no foreseeable reinvigoration of the stagnated DDA process, the EU, 
later than the US, seems to end the de facto moratorium on launching new (bilateral) 
free trade agreements.17) However the EU is not tired in emphasizing with this 
new approach that “[t]here will be no European retreat from multilateralism.”18) 
1. New competitiveness-driven FTAs:
The EU in its Strategy for Growth and Jobs now strives for a new priority on 
highly emerging markets. The approach is “deepening” and “widening” the 
partnership.19) Partners for negotiations are thoroughly chosen based on their high 
market potential (in terms of economic size and growth) and significant economic 
benefits in eliminating tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers.20) “Deepening” refers 
to going beyond simple removal of tariffs and quotas to elimination of non-tariff 
barriers and going beyond trade in goods to services and direct investments while 
“widening” means integrating development, social and environmental concerns into 
trade liberalization and market opening objectives. 
This is the result that the EU’s trade policy instruments were rather aimed on 
development and stability through prosperity (by trade) and therefore deemed less 
important for the EU’s own competitiveness. 
Overall, it is significant that not a word is mentioned with regards to cooperation 
with the US in the Global Europe Strategy. Alas, a concerted economic cooperation 
between the EU and the US is even expressed as “wishful thinking” by some 
scholars21) as both economic superpowers are acting independently from each other. 
16) M Bungenberg, ‘Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon’, 1 
EYIEL (2010) 123, 124.
17) WH Cooper and others, ‘The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications 
for the United States’, CRS Report for Congress R41534 (16 June 2011) available at 
[www.crs.gov] visited on [28.7.2011] 5.
18) Communication of the European Commission (n 12) 10. 
19) Cf. Cremona (n 7) 247.
20) Report of the European Commission (n 13) 6.
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Moreover, the strategy paper shows the taking on the competition by the EU with 
the US and China for a better position in highly emerging markets, such as Asia 
and in particular, Korea.
C. New Generation
Not only for the EU, but for all other global players of the FTA/RTA game, 
the agreements shifted significantly after the Conference of Cancun 2004 to a new 
generation. FTAs from the 90s and early 2000s mainly focused on elimination of 
tariffs and were limited to the trade of goods. There were hardly any additional 
elements than the WTO acquis of the Uruguay Round. 
Among the newly negotiated so-called ‘WTOplus FTAs’, the EU-Korea FTA 
sets a new mark in the FTA world; some even see it as important as NAFTA in 
the past that “worked as the model template for […] customization”,22) assuming 
that the EU-Korea FTA might “become an important predecessor for subsequent 
FTA negotiations involving the EU”.23) Chances are quite high as both parties are 
very busy FTA negotiators.24)  
For the EU-Korea FTA, WTO standards, agreements and declarations have quite 
obviously served as the basic rules and as a framework for ongoing negotiations.25) 
21) Bungenberg (n 16) 124.
22) D Ahn, ‘Legal and Institutional Issues of Korea-EU FTA: New Model for Post-NAFTA 
FTAs?’ Sciences-Po/GEM Policy Brief October 2010, available at [http://gem.sciences-po.fr/ 
content/publications/pdf/AHN_KOREU%20FTA%20201010.pdf] visited on [21.3.2012] 
p.2; cf. also CM Brown, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements: A 
Case Study of the EU-Korea FTA’ 2 EYIEL (2011) 297, 298.
23) Ahn (n 22).
24) The EU is negotiating with trading partners such as Canada, India, Singapore and 
MERCOSUR; Korea’s FTA with the US is in force as of 15 March 2012; Korea is 
further negotiating with partners such as Canada and Australia and considers 
launching negotiations with China, Japan and MERCOSUR. 
25) Cremona (n 7) 246.
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I. Overview of the EU-Korea FTA:
The EU-Korea FTA consists of 15 Chapters, 3 Protocols and 4 Understandings. 
An elimination of 98.7% of duties in trade value within 5 years is foreseen, 
following a tariff elimination schedule consisting of immediate elimination of 
customs duties for the majority of goods. Only on sectors that are reciprocally 
acknowledged as sensitive, elimination schemes of 2, 5, and 7 years with a 
transitional regulation, that lowers exiting duties gradually to the mark of zero, are 
provided. Only very few items (less than 4 %)26) have either a longer transitional 
period or are excluded from the leverage.
The EU-Korea FTA covers in its chapters:
 - trade in goods (including market access, technical barriers to trade, trade 
remedies, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and customs and trade 
facilitation), 
 - trade in services and establishment (i.e. investment), 
 - capital movement, 
 - public procurement, 
 - intellectual property, 
 - competition, transparency and trade and sustainable development and 
 - a dispute settlement mechanism body. 
II. WTOplus Character
Some selected examples of the EU-Korea FTA will show that the Agreement 
set new standards going beyond existing and binding WTO obligations.27) For this 
reason, these are also called WTOplus provisions: These norms refer to pertinent 
WTO instruments, already binding on both parties (somewhat like a common 
denominator) but then formulating provisions that substantially go beyond the 
26) E.g. fisheries products, rice and other agricultural products.
27) See DC Horng (n 9) 315; on WTO-plus elements: see M Kawai and G Wignaraja, 
‘Multilateralizing regional trade arrangement in Asia’ in: R Baldwin and P Low (eds), 
Multilateralizing Regionalism (CUP 2009) 495, 515ff.
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existing, making them legally binding between the two sides. 
1. Trade in Goods:
❙ Art. 2.1 FTA:
  “The parties shall progressively and reciprocally liberalise trade in goods […] in 
accordance with this Agreement and in conformity with Article XXIV of GATT 
1994 .”                                                 (emphasis added)
Of particular significance is Section C of Chapter 2, Art. 2.14 FTA: Elimination 
of Sectoral Non-Tariff Measures, Annexes 2-B through 2-E.
❙ Art. 1 (1) of Annex 2-B:
  “Recalling the obligations of the Parties under the WTO Agreement, in 
particular the TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) Agreement, and recognizing the 
importance of electronics […]”
❙ Art. 1 (1)(d) Annex 2-B:
  “promoting ‘one test’ and, where practicable, a supplier's declaration of conformity 
through elimination of duplicative and unnecessary burdensome conformity assessment 
procedures;”
❙ Art. 2 (2) Annex 2-B:
  “Where relevant international standards established by the ISO (International 
Organisation for Standards), IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) and 
ITU (International Telecommunication Union) exist, the Parties shall use these 
international standards or the relevant parts of them as a basis for any standard, 
technical regulation or conformity assessment procedure.”
The major innovation is not as obvious as it seems: It is the very first time that 
an EU trade agreement explicitly addresses specific sectoral non-tariff barriers.28)
 
 
This results from lessons learned in the past: Elimination of tariff barriers does 
28) Brown (n 22) 301.
704   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제3호 (2012. 9.)
not necessarily mean unbarred real market access. Largely varying standardization 
rules can cause the same consequences. With this FTA, international standard 
setting bodies now have to be considered equivalent to Korean standards; another 
possibility of protective regulation is thus removed. These rules apply, as shown, 
for electronics (B), and in a similar way for motor vehicle and parts (C), 
pharmaceutical products and medical devices (D), and chemicals (E). 
2. Trade in Services: 
In a similar manner as in the trade in goods section, the parties are generally 
committed to liberalization of trade in services in accordance with Art. V GATS, 
another pillar of WTO agreements of 1994. 
Market access commitments of the EU-Korea FTA go beyond GATS obligations 
regarding liberalization of establishment (investment) in both most of the services 
sector and most of the non-services sector. The FTA’s scope includes transport 
(postal, courier and international maritime), telecommunications, finance, environmental 
services, construction and legal services. 
An interesting observation can be made in the sectoral commitment on access to 
the Korean legal services market. 
❙ Art 7.7 (1) FTA:
  “The sectors liberalised by each Party pursuant to this Section and, by means 
of reservations, the market access and national treatment limitations applicable 
to services and service suppliers of the other Party in those sectors are set out 
in the lists of commitments included in Annex 7-A.”
Annex 7-A-4 under “Legal Services” provides for limitations to Market Access 
and MFN standard that can be simplified for a better understanding to the 
following: Immediately after entry into force of the EU-Korea FTA, lawyers and 
EU law firms may establish a branch office to offer advice in foreign and 
international law, i.e. which allows to provide legal services in areas outside 
Korean domestic law. 
After two years after entry into force of the FTA (2 year scheme) a foreign 
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law firm may fee share with a Korean law firm, either on a project-by-project 
basis or on an ongoing basis. Finally five years after the FAT’s entry into force 
Korean and foreign lawyers may go into partnerships and foreign law firms may 
employ Korean lawyers.
However, representation for juridical or statutory procedures in courts and other 
government agencies as well as preparation of legal documents are explicitly 
excluded from liberalization. Furthermore, legal representation for the entrustment 
of the preparation of notarial deeds, activities concerning labour affairs and 
consulting services on real property in Korea, intellectual property rights and other 
rights requiring registration as well as legal cases concerning family relations or 
inheritance are still kept exclusively for Korean lawyers.
Therefore, it is a significant step for Korea in opening its legal services market,29) 
but it is still far from being liberalized in its sense though we certainly have to 
take into account that providing legal services belongs to the very national 
oriented fields of profession.
3. Government Procurement
Another innovative feature of the EU-Korea FTA is the chapter on government 
procurement, Chapter 9 FTA:
❙ Art. 9.1 (1) FTA:
  “The Parties reaffirm their rights and obligations under the Agreement on 
Government Procurement contained in Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement (GPA 
1994) […]”
❙ Art. 9.1. (3) FTA:
  “Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to derogate from either Party’s rights 
or obligations under the GPA 1994, or from an agreement which replaces it.”
❙ Art. 9.1. (4) FTA:
  “For all procurement covered by this Chapter, the Parties shall apply the 
provisionally agreed revised GPA text (“revised GPA”) […]”
29) Cf. Horng (n 9) 313f.
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The EU-Korea FTA is the first international agreement to make effective the 
so-called WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) in its revised form.30) 
No other chapter of the present FTA makes it clearer how a sectoral agreement is 
'simply' built on existing (and binding) commitment on multilateral level.
4. Intellectual Property Rights
The EU Korea FTA goes significantly beyond WTO TRIPS Agreement which 
becomes also immanent in closer looking at this provision:
❙ Art. 10.2 (1) Cl. 2 FTA:
  “The provisions of this Chapter shall complement and specify the rights and 
obligations between the Parties under the TRIPS Agreement.”
Furthermore, Chapter 10 dealing with Intellectual Property is by far the most 
detailed part within the FTA. Particularly provisions on copyright and the 
protection guaranteed for right holders are more than extensive. It is for the 
reason of these protective measures that the EU-Korea FTA turns out to be a 
Mixity as shown above. It includes provisions on civil and criminal enforcement 
measures which remain in the national competences of EU Member States.31) 
Another significant WTOplus- feature is the extensive list of Geographical 
Indications (GIs). GIs in Europe are well known by legal disputes over rights to 
name products according to their geographical provenance such as Emmenthal or 
Camembert Cheese or Cognac and Champagne. The list in the FTA contains 
already over 200 entries, including Bayerisches Bier and Münchner Bier as well 
as all sorts of agricultural products from Europe and Korea. The provisions permit 
new entries onto the list. 
III. A Specific European “New Generation”
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009) came in timely 
30) Brown (n 22) 303.
31) Cf. (n 5).
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manners right before the FTA was ready for signature (6 October 2010). The 
Treaty of Lisbon has changed the exercise of EU competences regarding the 
Common Commercial Policy so significantly that some even call it a “new era for 
the orientation of the commercial policy”.32)   
With the Lisbon Treaty the Union gained explicit legal personality by virtue of 
Art. 47 Treaty on European Union (TEU).33) This concept is nothing really new 
as the European Community (EC) had undoubtedly legal personality, though it has 
been disputed if the EU had legal personality in its sense. With Art. 47 TEU, it 
is set clear that the EU is a legal person in Public International Law within the 
legal frame of the principle of enumerated powers.34) However, the European 
Council is very thorough on behalf of the Member States which can be seen in 
No. 24 of Declarations annexed to the Lisbon Final Act35) :
“The Conference confirms that the fact that the European Union has a legal 
personality will not in any way authorises the Union to legislate or to act beyond 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.” 
(emphasis added)
After the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU gained exclusive competences, particularly 
in all matters concerning the Union’s external commercial policy (Art. 3 TFEU). 
In the past, RTAs were always Mixities triggering a vast amount of competence 
norms of the Treaty and making their entry into force an unforeseeable matter of 
time.36) Since Lisbon, most of the substantive competences have shifted to the 
Union such as all commercial matters, including matters of foreign direct investments. 
32) A Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of 
the Common Commercial Policy’, 15 EFAR (2010) 153, 169.
33) See Streinz (n 5) MN 1180f.; R Streinz, C Ohler and C Herrmann, Der Vertrag von 
Lissabon zur Reform der EU (3rd edn, C.H. Beck 2010) 132.
34) cf. Art. 5 (1)(1), (2)(2) TEU, Art. 7 TFEU.
35) OJ EU (2010) C 83/346 (20.3.2010), Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 
December 2007.
36) Cf. above (n 7).
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This makes the EU-Korea FTA provisionally applicable for the major part of the 
agreement which fall sunder the exclusive competence of the EU.37) 
In addition, the European Parliament acted for the first time as co-legislator in 
commercial matters together with the Council in approving the FTA.38) This is 
significant because it is the first trade agreement for which the European 
Parliament made use of its new competence under the Treaty of Lisbon.
D. Conclusion and Outlook: A New Era?
As mentioned, the EU-Korea FTA is the most ambitious and comprehensive 
agreement both parties have negotiated. It is to note that in the opinion of 
scholars, it is a bilateral free trade agreement that is second in significance only 
to NAFTA,39) with a potential to act as a new model and therefore to herald a 
new era of world trade. 
The failure of the Conference of Cancun marked the failure of the Doha Round 
and a couple of years later it turns out that further achievement cannot be reached 
on a multilateral stage. Bilateral free trade agreements carry a great potential for 
the parties, but carry also a potential threat to the multilateral system.40)  
An easily understandable example is the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause. 
The MFN principle in the trading system is understood as a universal principle, 
providing trade on the basis of non-discrimination. GATT in Art XXIV and 
GATS in Art. V provide clauses for cases of free trade agreements and customs 
unions that exempt contracting states from the MFN principle.41)  
37) Nevertheless, RTAs will most likely remain Mixities, cf. M Cremona, ‘Balancing 
Union and Member State interests: Opinion 1/2008, Choice of Legal Base and the 
Common Commercial Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon’, 35 E.L.Rev. (2010) 678, 
692.
38) Art. 207(2) TFEU.
39) Brown (n 22) 298.
40) See also Cho (n 15) 34 f.
41) Similarly, see SJ Cho, ‘Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: 
A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism’ 42 HarvILJ (2001) 436-7.
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However, with the immense increase of FTAs being concluded42) one might 
question the proper meaning of the MFN principle if a majority of financially 
strong States can easily fall back to its network of FTAs that it has concluded 
with other financially strong States that probably make up the majority of each 
other's trade volumes. The principle becomes more than questionable as soon as 
the relation of rules and exceptions on WTO principles flips. It cannot be 
advocated for a rule that has been overruled by such a great number of 
exceptions that practically annul the achievements of the rule. With a network of 
bilateral agreements there will be more States that fall behind making them more 
vulnerable and dependent on strong countries or those that have negotiated a FTA 
network at the right time. 
A different approach supports the EU’s new view on the bilateral agreements. 
As declared that “there will be no European retreat from multilateralism”,43) the 
European approach sees FTAs include issues not yet covered by rules for trade 
relations. With the Global Strategy the EU has recognized the multilateral system 
being stalled and that no further achievements could be reached on that stage. 
Nonetheless the problems the EU also estimated in FTA proliferation in the past, 
now is being advocated for with the argument that under the right conditions, 
FTAs can “build on” the WTO and “prepare the ground” for multinational 
liberalization, acting as a stepping stone rather than a stumbling block44) and can 
even be regarded as “test laboratories for the multilateral trading system”.45) 
States on the one hand, that have already concluded a network of FTAs of 
WTOplus character won’t bar for the same content on multilateral level and States 
on the other hand that have fallen back in FTA negotiations will feel the need to 
move forward to a more liberalized world trade. Thus, today, it is not to negate 
that world trade needs further improvements and a further liberalized market to 
persist in the more and more globalized and competitive world. 
42) Over 214 RTAs currently in force; cf. ‘List of all RTAs in force’ by the WTO, 
available at [http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx] visited on [21.3.2012].
43) See (n 12).
44) Cf. Cremona (n 7) 246 cf. also Horng (n 9) 326.
45) Cho (n 41), 433.
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The Doha Round being stalled, FTAs seem to cause problems in the multilateral 
system on first sight. On the long-run, however, it can be concluded that FTAs 
with provisions going beyond WTO will one day lead to a new stage of 
multilateral agreements and a new deal on the Doha Development Agenda. In this 
development, the EU-Korea FTA indeed could well be regarded as a model FTA 
so as with enough potential to herald a new era of world trade. 
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